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Sullivan, the Appellant herein, was represented through trial by Steven Payton and at 
sentencing by Ronald J. Yengich. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the judgment and conviction concerning Kory Sullivan 
(hereinafter "Appellant") for Aggravated Assault, a Second Degree Felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103. (Add. II; Tr. at 190).1 
This Court obtains jurisdiction to hear this appeal of a criminal case involving a 
second degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
References to the attached Addenda shall hereinafter be cited as Add. [page number]. 
References to the trial transcript, recording the proceedings of January 11, 2005, which is 
part of the record of the trial court, shall be cited as Tr. [page number]. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
/. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant the opportunity to 
cross-examine witnesses regarding a civil suit filed by the victim, 
which evidenced bias and included factual claims inconsistent with 
trial testimony. 
"Our standard of review on the admissibility of hearsay evidence is complex, since 
the determination of admissibility 'often contains a number of rulings, each of which may 
require a different standard of review.'" Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of 
Appellate Review, 12 Utah Bar J. 8, 38 (1999). This Court reviews the legal questions to 
make the determination of admissibility for correctness. Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 
979 (Utah 1993). We review the questions of fact for clear error. State v. Parker, 2000 
UT 51, lfl| 13, 4 P.3d 778. Finally, we review the district court's ruling on admissibility 
for abuse of discretion. Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, fflf 10, 94 P.3d 
193." State v. Workman, —P.3d—, 2005 WL 2429413 (Utah 2005). 
This issue was preserved where Defense Counsel began to question witnesses 
regarding the inconsistent statements made in civil pleadings and where the trial court 
disallowed such a line of questioning. (Tr. At 74-76; 140; 180). 
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II. Whether reversal is warranted where the prosecution failed to 
provide the defense with an exculpatory photograph indicating that 
the injury may have been caused by another party as well as a copy 
of a video of witness interviews. 
Whether the State's failure to provide items of discovery violates the rules and 
rights described and set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny 
is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. See e.g. Tillman v. State, 128 P.3d 1123 
(Utah 2005). 
This issue was preserved through Defense Counsel's specific objection raised just 
before trial proceedings began. (Tr. at 42-43). 
Ill Whether the trial court committed reversible error where it failed to 
strike two jurors for cause, one of whom had been raped a mere ten 
days earlier while the other had been the victim of an assault. 
Whether a trial court erred in failing to exclude jurors for cause and whether such 
error prejudiced a defendant are questions of law that should be reviewed de novo. See 
State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1997). 
This issue was preserved where the district court refused to grant Appellant's 
motions to strike two jurors for cause. (Tr. at 14-18). 
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RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are referred to 
in Appellants' brief and are reproduced at Addendum I: Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
An Information filed on or about May 6, 2003, charged Appellant as follows: 
Count I, Aggravated Assault, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-103; and Count II, Interfering With a Legal Arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-305. (Add. II). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Count II, Interfering With a Legal Arrest, was dismissed following the preliminary 
hearing in this case. A jury trial regarding Count I was held on January 11, 2006.(Tr. at 2) 
C. Disposition in Trial Court 
Appellant was convicted of one count of Aggravated Assault, a second degree 
felony, after having been found guilty by a jury on January 11, 2005. He was sentenced 
on September 26, 2005, to a prison term of one to fifteen years in the custody of the 
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Board of Pardons. However, this prison term was suspended and Appellant was placed 
on probation for 36 months under the following conditions: he was ordered to serve 180 
days in jail, he was ordered to pay a fine of $2,000 including the applicable surcharge, 
and he was ordered to comply with the usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult 
Probation and Parole. Appellant was sentenced in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S. Atherton presiding. He is no 
longer incarcerated. (Add. II). 
D. Statement of Material Facts 
On January 11, 2005, a jury trial was held in the above referenced matter before 
the Honorable Judith Atherton. The State was represented by Anne Cameron, Deputy 
Salt Lake District Attorney. Appellant was represented by his attorney, Steven Payton. 
Prior to trial, Mr. Payton moved for a continuance for medical reasons. It appears that, at 
the time of trial, he was under the care of an orthopedic surgeon and did not feel that he 
could adequately go forward. (Jury Trial Transcript at 46:03-09). Mr. Payton indicated 
that his left hand had been crushed in an accident and he was currently participating in 
physical therapy twice a week and was taking anti-inflammatory medication. (Tr. at 
46:08-09). Mr. Payton requested a six-week delay for medical reasons; however, 
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nonetheless, the court denied Mr. Payton's motion to continue and the trial went forward 
as scheduled. (Tr. at 45:05). 
During jury selection, the defense moved to strike two jurors for cause. (Tr. at 
28:19; 40:23-32:03). When the court asked the jury pool whether any members of their 
close families or friends had been victims of a crime, seven jurors responded 
affirmatively. (Tr. at 14:13-18:06). Specifically, Mr. Kennedy and Ms. Johnson both 
indicated that they had been victims of physical abuse. (Tr. at 14:15-15:03; 17:19-18:06). 
Mr. Kennedy stated that he was the victim of a physical altercation that occurred during a 
University of Utah football game several years ago. (Tr. at 17:20). Ms. Johnson stated 
that she had been the victim of a rape, just ten days prior, and that she had begun pressing 
charges against the individual. (Tr. at 14:22). Both jurors indicated that their 
experiences would not affect their ability to serve on the jury. (Tr. at 15:3; 18:6). The 
court denied both motions to strike for cause; however neither juror served on the 
empanelled jury. (Tr. at 35:20; 41:12; 41:24-25). In selecting the jury, the defense 
exhausted all of its peremptory challenges and used these challenges to remove the two 
jurors at issue. 
Before the jury was sworn and opening statements were given, Mr. Payton made a 
record as to various evidentiary issues and objections. (Tr. at 42:09-20). Specifically, in 
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one of his interviews, Detective Parks referenced a photograph which showed that the 
victim had a shoe print on his face; Mr. Payton indicated that such evidence would be 
exculpating as no witness intimated that Appellant ever kicked the victim. (Tr. at 42:09-
20; 43:10-16). Ms. Cameron stated that the she did not have such a photograph in her 
possession. (Tr. at 43:22). In addition, she said that she did not intend to use any such 
photograph during the trial. (Tr. at 43:07). The court decided to move forward with the 
trial because Ms. Cameron had indicated she would not be using the photograph. (Tr. at 
43:06). 
Secondly, Mr. Payton told the court that the State had failed to produce a copy of a 
videotaped interview with the victim's sister. (Tr. at 44:02-05). Reports showed that on 
March 31, 2003, Detective Park met with Crystal, the victim's sister, and did an audio 
and videotape interview with her; the defense was never provided with a copy of this 
interview. (Tr. at 44:02-05). 
Ms. Cameron blamed the failure to produce this interview on Mr. Payton's 
untimely request for the material. (Tr. at 44:16-18). "My office received Mr. Payton's 
request for videotapes, audio tapes and all other types of discovery evidence on the 5th of 
January, which was last Wednesday." (Tr. at 44:16-18). Ms. Cameron indicated that the 
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videotape "might possibly be in the mail and be being sent to him;" however, Mr. Payton 
had not received the videotape as of trial. (Tr. at 44:20; 45:10). 
Judge Atherton subsequently reprimanded Mr. Payton for filing his discovery 
motion so late. (Tr. at 45:13-23). Specifically, the court recognized that Mr. Payton filed 
his appearance of counsel on March 8, 2004, the matter has been set for jury trial on two 
occasions, but, nonetheless, Mr. Payton did not file a motion for discovery throughout the 
entire process until just days before trial. (Tr. at 16-19). "It's inconceivable to me really 
that a request for discovery comes in four days before trial and you've been involved in 
this case for about 16 months." (Tr. at 21-23). Eventually, Mr. Payton agreed to 
proceed with the trial. (Tr. at 46:21-23). 
During trial, Ms. Phyllis Khoury testified on behalf of the State. (Tr. at 53:20). 
Ms. Khoury testified that she was the general manager of Dimitri's on the night in 
question. (Tr. at 55:24). She was standing at the door when several customers 
approached her as they were leaving and complained about three patrons, the Sullivan 
brothers. (Tr. at 56:17). As Ms. Khoury approached the Sullivan brothers, she saw 
Appellant push Brian, his brother, into Ian Walston. (Tr. at 61:24-62:09). She stepped in 
between them. (Tr. at 57:10-11). Khoury testified that, shortly thereafter, Appellant 
pushed her and then "came over [her] shoulder with a flying punch" and immediately 
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made contact with Mr. Walston's jaw. (Tr. at 57:15-16; 64:05-06). The punch knocked 
Mr. Walston unconscious. (Tr. at 64:10). Ms. Khoury immediately left the scene to 
telephone the paramedics and the sheriffs department. (Tr. at 64:22-24). 
On cross examination, Mr. Payton attempted to illustrate the many inconsistencies 
between Ms. Khoury's statements to Detective Park on April 1, 2003, and her statements 
made during her direct examination. (Tr. at 68:19-21; 70:07-09; 78:20). Mr. Payton 
began to question Ms. Khoury about a civil suit that was filed against Dimitri's under the 
auspice that Ms. Khoury had changed her testimony to better protect herself and Dimitri's 
from civil liability. (Tr. at 75:08-13). The following dialogue occurred: 
Mr. Payton: Mr. Walston has filed suit against your employer, isn't that 
correct? (Tr. at 75:08-09). 
Ms. Khoury: No he has not. (Tr. at 75:10). 
Mr. Payton: He hasn't filed suit against Dimitri's or you don't know? (Tr. 
at 75:11-12). 
Ms. Khoury: I don't know if he has or not. (Tr. at 75:13). 
Mr. Payton: So your original statement, he has not, is not- (Tr. at 75:14). 
Ms. Khoury: He has not to my knowledge but I do not know. (Tr. at 
75:15). 
Mr. Payton: Do you know if he's included you in that lawsuit? (Tr. at 
75:16). 
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Ms. Cameron: Objection, asked and answered. (Tr. at 75:17). 
Court: Sustained. (Tr. at 75:18). 
Mr. Payton: And you've been contacted by civil counsel in connection 
with giving your deposition in the litigation? (Tr. at 75:19-21). 
Ms. Khoury: No, I have not. (Tr. at 75:22) 
Mr. Payton: So you know nothing about any civil lawsuit that Mr. Walston 
has filed. (Tr. at 75:23-24). 
Ms. Khoury: No, I do not. (Tr. at 75:25). 
Mr. Payton: And that's your testimony today under oath. (Tr. at 76:01). 
Ms. Khoury: That's my testimony today under oath. (Tr. at 76:02). 
Mr. Payton: Assuming with (inaudible) such a suit has in fact been filed, 
do you- (Tr. at 76:03-04). 
Ms. Cameron: Objection, Your Honor, this is so far outside the scope of 
direct. It's entirely irrelevant. (Tr. at 76:05-06). 
The Court: Sustained. (Tr. at 76:07). 
As a result of the court's ruling, Mr. Payton was unable to further explore the civil 
lawsuit or to illuminate to the jury the reasons that Ms. Khoury changed her story and her 
potential biases to lie to insulate herself and the corporation from liability. (Tr. at 76:07). 
Next, the State called Debbie Dixon to the stand. (Tr. at 80:12). Ms. Dixon 
testified that she was a patron of the club on the night in question. (Tr. at 81:08-09). She 
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stated that Brian Sullivan bumped into the table where Mr. Walston was standing, and, as 
a result, Mr. Walston exchanged words with him. (Tr. at 87:23-25). Mr. Walston then 
crossed over the stage to the seating section of the club and picked up a chair. (Tr. at 
89:05-17). Ms. Dixon testified that Mr. Walston picked the chair up off the ground about 
two inches, then everyone began yelling, "No, no, put it down, put it down," implying 
that the chair was lifted in an aggressive manner. (Tr. at 89:18-21). Subsequently, Mr. 
Walston put the chair back on the ground. (Tr. at 89:21). After Mr. Walston put the 
chair back down, Ms. Dixon testified that Appellant "came around the group and just 
cocked back and just crunched [Mr. Walston]." (Tr. at 89:22-23). It appeared that Mr. 
Walston was passed out for a short period of time and that he was bleeding from his 
mouth. (Tr. at 91:01-07). Once the paramedics arrived, Ms. Dixon left the scene and 
went outside for some fresh air. (Tr. at 91:21-25). 
Finally, the State called Ian Walston to the stand. (Tr. at 107:09-10). Mr. Walston 
testified that he had been drinking earlier that evening and he was feeling a little bit 
"buzzed" at the time of the incident. (Tr. at 109:01-07). Mr. Walston testified that his 
memory of the events was limited, but he remembered walking past the bar and 
"accidentally [getting] caught up in [a fight]." (Tr. at 110:06-07). He stated that he 
remembered being punched and then slapped him in the face by Matt Sullivan. (Tr. at 
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110:22-23; 111:12). Mr. Walston testified that the first punch hit him on his cheekbone 
so hard that he saw white spots. (Tr. at 111:15-18). Mr. Walston turned to Matt Sullivan 
and said, "What did I do to you? What's going on? I'm not part of this." (Tr. at 110:24-
25). Matt Sullivan just started swearing at Mr. Walston and said, "Fin going to kill you." 
(Tr. at 113:04-05). A bouncer came to the scene and began holding Matt Sullivan back 
from Mr. Walston. (Tr. at 113:17-19). At this point, Mr. Walston testified that he began 
backing up and the next thing he remembered was waking up in an ambulance; he never 
saw anyone hit him. (Tr. at 114:03). Mr. Walston testified that, as a result of the injuries 
he sustained at Dimitri's, he was forced to undergo invasive surgery, his mouth was 
wired shut for several months, he experienced severe pain, he has been diagnosed with 
TMJ, and he has chronic problems with his bite. (Tr. at 116:18, 117:04; 118:10, 122:15). 
Mr. Payton desired to cross examine Mr. Walston about inconsistent statements he 
had made regarding his injuries. In his civil lawsuit complaint, Mr. Walston stated that 
he was kicked repeatedly. (Tr. at 180:24). Mr. Payton desired to cross-examine Mr. 
Walston about these statements; however, the court refused to allow this line of 
questioning, or any reference to the civil lawsuit. (Tr. at 180:15). 
The defense waived its right to put on evidence and proceeded with closing 
arguments. Mr. Payton began his closing argument by quoting verses from The Bible. 
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(Tr. at 165:21-25). He proceeded to discuss various aspects of the case and to present a 
factual argument for innocence; however, he also continually referred back to the Bible. 
(Tr. at 175:20-24). At one point, he specifically admonished the jury to go check his 
Bible verses and verify the content of what he proclaimed. (Tr. at 175:23). 
The jury retired to deliberate for a short period of time, and, subsequently, 
returned with a unanimous verdict. (Tr. at 178:25; 189:23). The jury's verdict found 
Appellant guilty of Aggravated Assault. (Tr. at 190:08-09). Subsequently, Appellant 
was sentenced on September 26, 2005, to a prison term of 1-15 years in the custody of 
the Board of Pardons. However, this prison term was suspended and Appellant was 
placed on probation for 36 months under the following conditions: he was ordered to 
serve 180 days in jail, he was ordered to pay a fine of $2,000.00, and he was ordered to 
comply with the usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation and Parole. 
Subsequently, he filed this appeal from the judgment, conviction and commitment that 
was entered against him on September 26, 2005. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In the instant case, the State proceeded on the theory that Mr. Walston's injuries 
were caused by a single strike by Appellant. However, the jury was disallowed the 
opportunity to consider two key pieces of evidence that contradicted the State's theory in 
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this regard. The district court disallowed Appellant's trial counsel, Mr. Payton, from 
exploring contradictory statements made Mr. Walston, who was one of the State's 
primary witnesses. Mr. Walston had previously alleged, in a civil suit he filed against 
Appellant and several others, that he had been punched and kicked numerous times by 
several parties. This statement directly contradicted the testimony presented at trial and 
the State's theory of the case. Nonetheless, the district court denied Appellant the 
opportunity to explore the details and circumstances of this contradictory statement. 
The foregoing error was compounded by the State's actions in failing to provide 
Defendant with exculpatory evidence including a photograph that indicated that the 
victim had been kicked. This evidence was exculpatory in that it also contradicted the 
State's theory of the case: that Appellant caused the injuries at issue by a single strike. 
This indicated that the injuries at issue were caused by another party and that the extent 
of the injuries should not be attributed to Appellant. This distinction becomes especially 
important where the extent of the injuries caused is an enumerated element of the offense 
charged, second degree Aggravated Assault. Where the State failed to provide 
exculpatory evidence going to this element, and where the jury was otherwise prevented 
from hearing pertinent evidence contradicting the State's theory of the case, reversal is 
appropriate. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENSE THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES 
REGARDING A CIVIL SUIT FILED BY THE VICTIM, WHICH 
EVIDENCED BIAS AND INCLUDED FACTUAL CLAIMS 
INCONSISTENT WITH TRIAL TESTIMONY. 
In the instant case, where Appellant was charged with Aggravated Assault, a 
second degree felony, the State was required to establish the following elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt: that the defendant committed an assault as defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-102, that the defendant caused a serious bodily injury thereby, and that the 
defendant did so intentionally. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103. In the instant case, Mr. 
Payton desired to cross examine Mr. Walston about inconsistent statements he had made 
regarding his injuries. In his civil lawsuit complaint, Mr. Walston stated that he was 
kicked repeatedly by multiple parties. (Tr. at 180:24). Mr. Payton desired to cross-
examine Mr. Walston about these statements; however, the trial court refused to allow 
this line of questioning, or any reference to the civil lawsuit. (Tr. at 140, 180:15). 
Similarly, when Mr. Payton began to question Ms. Khoury about the civil suit that 
was filed against Dimitri's under the auspice that Ms. Khoury had changed her testimony 
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to better insulate herself and Dimitri's from civil liability. (Tr. at 75:08-13). The 
following dialogue occurred: 
Mr. Payton: Mr. Walston has filed suit against your employer, isn't that 
correct? (Tr. at 75:08-09). 
Ms. Khoury: No he has not. (Tr. at 75:10). 
Mr. Payton: He hasn't filed suit against Dimitri's or you don't know? (Tr. 
at 75:11-12). 
Ms. Khoury: I don't know if he has or not. (Tr. at 75:13). 
Mr. Payton: So your original statement, he has not, is not- (Tr. at 75:14). 
Ms. Khoury: He has not to my knowledge but I do not know. (Tr. at 
.75:15). 
Mr. Payton: Do you know if he's included you in that lawsuit? (Tr. at 
75:16). 
Ms. Cameron: Objection, asked and answered. (Tr. at 75:17). 
Court: Sustained. (Tr. at 75:18). 
Mr. Payton: And you've been contacted by civil counsel in connection 
with giving your deposition in the litigation? (Tr. at 75:19-21). 
Ms. Khoury: No, I have not. (Tr. at 75:22) 
Mr. Payton: So you know nothing about any civil lawsuit that Mr. Walston 
has filed. (Tr. at 75:23-24). 
Ms. Khoury: No, I do not. (Tr. at 75:25). 
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Mr. Payton: And that's your testimony today under oath. (Tr. at 76:01). 
Ms. Khoury: That's my testimony today under oath. (Tr. at 76:02). 
Mr. Payton: Assuming with (inaudible) such a suit has in fact been filed, 
do you- (Tr. at 76:03-04). 
Ms. Cameron: Objection, Your Honor, this is so far outside the scope of 
direct. It's entirely irrelevant. (Tr. at 76:05-06). 
The Court: Sustained. (Tr. at 76:07). 
Consequently, the district court denied Appellant the opportunity to explore any 
issues or facts regarding the civil lawsuit on the basis of relevance. However, the fact 
that Mr. Walston filed a civil law suit against Appellant was relevant for several reasons 
including the fact that it established witness bias and a motive to fabricate. Furthermore, 
the civil pleading contained inconsistent statements and supported the argument that any 
"serious bodily injury" was caused by a third party. 
It is well established that the Sixth Amendment right allowing a defendant to 
confront his accuser, as well as its counterpart under Article 1 Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, must allow for a full and effective cross-examination into areas of witness 
bias. Indeed under Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, extrinsic evidence of bias is 
expressly allowed to challenge a witness's credibility. Therefore, the State's argument 
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that such evidence of bias exceeded the scope of direct and the district court's conclusion 
that such matters were irrelevant were misplaced. 
In State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986), the court held that it was error for 
the trial court to deny a defendant the opportunity to enter into a full cross-examination 
regarding a civil action filed by the victim, which evinced bias and a motive to fabricate. 
The court reasoned that "Although the trial court has discretion in limiting cross-
examination, this Court has been careful to allow wide latitude for examination in the 
areas of bias and motive." Id. at 499. 
In Rammel, the court held that the failure to allow for cross-examination into the 
substance of the civil suit constituted error. However, the court further held that, given 
the circumstances of that case, the error was harmless because the evidence before the 
jury otherwise informed them as to the basis for bias and motive to fabricate. Granted, 
"Courts have found no prejudice where information that may be brought out by further 
questioning was already before the jury either from the testimony of others or by 
implication from the witness9 own testimony." Id.; quoting State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 
1386, 1388 (Utah 1977). In Rammel, the implication from the witness5 testimony was 
that a civil suit was filed and that there was a basis for bias or motive to fabricate. In 
contrast, in this case, the implication from the allowed testimony was that no civil law 
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suit was filed. Where Ms. Khoury testified that she had no knowledge of a civil case, 
even though she was the manager of the establishment, the jury was left with the 
impression that no civil suit was filed. By denying Appellant any opportunity to correct 
this misconception during the cross-examination of Mr. Walston, the trial court allowed 
the jury to proceed under this continued misconception. Therefore, where the jury in 
Rammel was otherwise provided the information going to bias, the jury in the case at bar 
was not. Consequently, where the error may have been harmless in Rammel, Appellant's 
substantial rights were implicated by the error in this case. Consequently, where the trial 
court's error implicated the substantial rights of the accused, reversal is warranted in the 
instant case. 
II. REVERSAL IS WARRANTED IN THE INSTANT CASE WHERE 
THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVIDE THE DEFENSE 
WITH AN EXCULPATORY PHOTOGRAPH INDICATING 
THAT THE INJURY MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY 
ANOTHER PARTY. 
It is well accepted that due process generally prevents the Government from 
suppressing evidence favorable to the accused, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith 
of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). As the Supreme Court 
explained in Brady, due process requires the production of evidence which is materially 
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favorable to the accused, either as direct or impeaching evidence. Williams v. Button, 
400 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1968) cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1105; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 
U.S. 103 (1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). This requirement encompasses 
information bearing upon the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses. Napue v. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264 (1959); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a 
given witness may well be determinative of guilt or 
innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible 
interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's 
life or liberty may depend. 
Napue v. Illinois, supra, at 269. Other courts have concluded that the trial court's 
supervisory power to safeguard the correct administration of justice in the courts 
reinforces this disclosure requirement. See e.g. United States v. Consolidated Laundries 
Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 571 (2nd Cir. 1961); United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 835, 832 (2nd 
Cir. 1969); see generally Communist Party of the United States v. S.A.C.B., 351 U.S. 115, 
124(1956). 
Furthermore, the disclosure of information impeaching the credibility of witnesses 
must be accomplished early so as to accommodate the effective preparation for trial. 
United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573, 578 (2nd Cir. 1969); United States v. Baxter, 492 
F.2d 150, 173-174 (9th Cir. 1973); cert, denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974). 
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Disclosure by the government must be made at such a time as 
to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively 
in the preparation and presentation of its case, even if 
satisfaction of this criterion requires pretrial disclosure. 
United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 924. 
Courts have accorded this right to pretrial disclosure such weight that, even when the 
favorable information takes the form of a witness statement otherwise protected from 
pretrial discovery by the Jencks Act (19 U.S.C. §3500), the prosecution must nonetheless 
disclose it as early as practically required for the defense to make fair use of it. See E.g., 
United States v. Narciso, 446 F.Supp. 252, 270-71, (E.D. Mich. 1976); United States v. 
Houston, 339 F.Supp. 762 (N.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. Eley, 335 F.Supp. 353, 358 
(N.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. Gleason, 265 F.Supp. 880, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 888 (1972). Compare United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th 
Cir. 1979). 
In the instant case, before the jury was sworn and opening statements were given, 
Mr. Payton made a record as to various evidentiary issues and objections. (Tr. at 42:09-
20). Specifically, in one of his interviews, Detective Parks referred to a photograph 
which showed that the victim had a shoe print on his face; Mr. Payton indicated that such 
evidence would be exculpating as no witness intimated that Defendant ever kicked the 
victim. (Tr. at 42:09-20; 43:10-16). Ms. Cameron stated that the she did not have such a 
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photograph in her possession. (Tr. at 43:22). In addition, she said that she did not intend 
to use any such photograph during the trial. (Tr. at 43:07). The court decided to move 
forward with the trial because Ms. Cameron had indicated she would not be using the 
photograph. (Tr. at 43:06). 
The defense specifically pointed out that the importance of the missing photograph 
was not that it might be used by the State to support its case but that it constituted 
exculpatory evidence favorable to the defense. Nonetheless, the Court overruled 
Appellant's objection on the basis that the State would not be introducing it. 
Photographs showing boot prints on the victim's body and face were exculpatory 
in that they indicated that any "serious bodily injury" sustained by Mr. Walston was not 
caused by Appellant's actions. Witnesses only ever stated that Appellant struck Mr. 
Walston once with his fist. Photographs showing that Mr. Walston was kicked 
repeatedly indicate that Appellant did not cause the serious bodily injury that may have 
been sustained. Again, as this is an express element of the crime charged, the 
photographs would have served an exculpatory purpose. 
As stated previously, it made no difference as to whether the prosecution acted in 
good or bad faith. Tillman v. State, 128 P.3d 1123, 1131 (Utah 2005). Furthermore, 
"[t]he duty to disclose favorable evidence is implicated even if the evidence is known 
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only to police investigators and not the prosecutor." Id. citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 
419, 438 (1995). Consequently, the State's assertion that it did not have the exculpatory 
photographs in its possession was irrelevant where an officer's report specifically 
referred to the photographs. Furthermore, the State's duty to disclose exculpatory 
evidence attaches "regardless of whether the evidence has been requested by the 
accused." Id. citing United States v. Agurs, All U.S. 97 (1976). Therefore, any 
questions as to the timing of Mr. Payton's request for discovery are similarly of no 
moment. 
In the instant case, exculpatory photographs were in the possession of either the 
State or its investigators. These photographs were not given to the defense either 
intentionally or through inadvertence. Nonetheless, the failure of the State to provide the 
defense with this exculpatory evidence implicated Appellant's right to Due Process and 
reversal is appropriate as a result. 
III. A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED IN THE INSTANT CASE 
WHERE THE COURT FAILED TO STRIKE TWO JURORS FOR 
CAUSE, ONE OF WHOM HAD BEEN RAPED A MERE TEN 
DAYS EARLIER WHILE THE OTHER HAD BEEN THE 
VICTIM OF AN ASSAULT. 
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During jury selection in the instant case, the defense moved to strike two jurors for 
cause. (Tr. at 28:19; 40:23-32:03). When the court asked the jury pool whether any of 
their close families or friends had been victims of a crime, seven jurors responded 
affirmatively. (Tr. at 14:13-18:06). Specifically, Mr. Kennedy and Ms. Johnson both 
indicated that they had been victims of physical abuse. (Tr. at 14:15-15:03; 17:19-18:06). 
Mr. Kennedy stated that he was the victim of a physical altercation that occurred during a 
University of Utah football game several years ago. (Tr. at 17:20). Ms. Johnson stated 
that she had been the victim of a rape, just ten days prior, and that she had begun pressing 
charges against the individual. (Tr. at 14:22). Both jurors indicated that their 
experiences would not affect their ability to serve on the jury. (Tr. at 15:3; 18:6). The 
court denied both motions to strike for cause; however neither juror served on the 
empaneled jury. (Tr. at 35:20; 41:12; 41:24-25). In selecting the jury, the defense 
exhausted all of its peremptory challenges and used these challenges to remove the two 
jurors at issue. 
Where the instant case involved allegations of an assault, it was improper to 
permit two victims of similar crimes to sit on the jury. Particularly in the case of Ms. 
Johnson, who was the victim of a very recent rape, impartiality could not be rehabilitated. 
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Where a potential juror is the recent victim of a similar crime, a challenge for-cause 
should be granted. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(d) establishes the right to peremptory 
challenges and provides in pertinent part: "A peremptory challenge is an objection to a 
juror for which no reason need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to ten 
peremptory challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory 
challenges." For many years, the pertinent rule, when addressing the improper denial of 
a motion to strike a juror for cause, was as follows: "reversal is required whenever a party 
is compelled 'to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a panel member who should 
have been stricken for cause/ " Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975). 
However, Crawford fs automatic reversal rule was reversed in favor of "the 
approach utilized by a majority of the states and upheld by the federal courts." State v. 
Menzies^ 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). Under Menzies, a defendant waives error by 
exercising peremptories to achieve an impartial jury. As the authorities embraced in 
Menzies explain, "So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had 
to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the [Constitution] was 
violated." Ross, 487 U.S. at 88, 108 S.Ct. at 2278 (citing Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 7 
S.Ct. 614, 30 L.Ed. 708 (1887)). Under Menzies, "[t]o prevail on a claim of error based 
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on the failure to remove a juror for cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., 
show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent." 889 P.2d at 398. 
In the instant case, trial counsel used peremptory challenges to remove the two 
jurors at issue. Therefore, the State will likely assert that the error in this instance was 
not prejudicial. Nonetheless, this Court can consider the cumulative error doctrine, 
where a court will reverse a defendant's conviction if 'the cumulative effect of the 
several errors undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had." Whitehead v. 
American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990); accord State v. Johnson, 
784 P.2d 1135, 1146 (Utah 1989). 
Appellant submits that the above argument, in conjunction with the trial court's 
inappropriate and unconstitutional limitations on cross-examination regarding the civil 
suit and the failure to order the production of exculpatory evidence cumulatively show 
that Appellant's right to a fair trial was prejudiced. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
conviction in this case and to remand the case to the district court for retrial. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Counsel for Appellant requests oral argument in the above matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of April, 2006. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
By 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed/delivered two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this day of April, 2006, to: 
Frederick Voros Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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ADDENDUM I 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-103 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*tilChapter 5. Offenses Against The Person 
^iiPart 1. Assault and Related Offenses 
•*§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 
76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection ( l ) (a ) , uses a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection ( l ) (a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection ( l ) (b ) is a third degree felony. 
ADDENDUM II 
Nuv-io-duuo iut u^ia rn IHIKU uibiKlut UUUK1 hAX NO. 8015783809 P. 02/04 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KORY MICHAEL SULLIVAN, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031903035 FS 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
Date: September 26, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: sunshinb 
Prosecutor: HALL, JEFFREY W 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : YENGICH, RONALD J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 25, 1975 
Video 
Tape Count: 9:35 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
2nd Degree Felony 
• Disposition: 01/11/2005 Guilty 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case NO: 031903035 
Date: Sep 26, 2005 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(a) 
in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 2 day(s) previously Berved. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $2000.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $918.92 
Due: $2000.00 
Total Fine: $2000.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Tot al Surcharge: $918.92 
Total Principal Due: $2000.00 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Defendant is to report by October 4, 2005 by 9:00 p.m.. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 2000.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
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Case No: 031903035 
Date: Sep 26, 2005 
Submit t o t e s t s of b rea th and ur ine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Off icer . 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, p a r t i c i p a t e in , and complete any program, counsel ing, or 
treatment as d i r e c t e d by the Department of Adult Probat ion and 
Parole. 
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Court ordered no contact with victim. 
Comply with A/D clauses per AP&P, Defendant not to go to Bars or 
Clubs, have a Substance Abuse and Mental Health evaluation and any 
recommended treatment per AP&P, Pay full restitutio 
Dated this /(Q day of ^o4fVV\fojPy^ 
JUDITH S A' 
District 
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ADDENDUM III 
RONALD J. YENG1CH, #3580 
YENGICH, RICH & XA1Z 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. 
KORY M. SULLIVAN, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 031903035 
: JUDGE JUDITH ATHERTON 
Defendant/Appellant, Kory Sullivan, by and through his attorney of record, Ronald J. 
Yengich, hereby gives notice of his intent to appeal several of this Honorable Court's rulings in 
the above captioned case. This Notice of Appeal in no way limits or waives Defendant's right to 
appeal any other findings or orders not specifically included herein. The Defendant is the party 
taking the instant appeal. The appeal will be taken from the Third District Court, the Honorable 
Judith Atherton presiding. The instant appeal will be taken to the Utah Court Of Appeals. The 
following issues and orders may be raised on appeal: Defendant will appeal this Court's denial of 
Defendant's Notice and Objection to Information Defects, which was filed on January 4, 2005; 
Defendant will appeal this Court's denial of his Motion to Continue filed shortly before trial on 
the basis that prior counsel needed additional time to adequately prepare for trial so as to secure 
Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel; Defendant will appeal 
his ultimate conviction for Aggravated Assault, including but not limited to whether sufficient 
evidence was presented at trial to substantiate the jury's guilty verdict, whether Defendant 
received the effective assistance of counsel and other trial issues that may become apparent once 
the trial transcript is fully reviewed. Defendant reserves the right to challenge any other finding 
or order issued in relation to this case and/or the associated conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j^Oday of October, 2005. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Appeal, this 3 ^ day of October, 2005, to the following: 
District Attorney's Office 
1 \ 1 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Court Reporter for Judge Atherton 
Carolyn Erickson 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
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